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1993]
DENYING THE DEVIL HIS DUE: CONTINGENCY FEE
MULTIPLIERS AFTER CITY OF BURLINGTON v. DAGUE
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress created the first federal fee-shifting statutes following the
Civil War to ensure enforcement of the newly-enacted civil rights acts.,
As a result, substantive civil rights and the enforcement mechanism of
fee-shifting have been "closely interwoven" from the outset.2 Fee-shift-
ing statutes allow winning parties who have brought suits to enforce cer-
tain constitutional and federal statutory rights to recover "reasonable"
attorney's fees from losing parties.3
Fee-shifting statutes were enacted to encourage private enforce-
ment of statutory civil rights and, to this day, Congress relies almost
exclusively on private lawyers to enforce these statutory rights.4 This
private enforcement scheme is founded on the notion that individuals
1. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911 ("The very first attorneys' fee statute was a civil rights
law, the Enforcement Act of 1870 .. ").
2. Id., 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910 ("[C]ivil rights and attorneys' fees have
always been closely interwoven.").
According to one source, there are well over 200 fee-shifting statutes at-
tached to substantive statutes on topics as diverse as bankruptcy and civil rights.
See JEFFREY R. GOODSTEIN, ATTORNEY'S FEES: WINNING A RECOVERY IN FEDERAL
COURT (1985) (identifying various federal fee-shifting provisions).
3. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913 ("The Supreme Court has laid down... the practice of
awarding attorneys' fees."). Due to the similarity of fee-shifting provisions, this
Note uses the term "civil rights" to refer to all statutory rights enforced by fee-
shifting statutes. See generally GOODSTEIN, supra note 2.
By way of example, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 pro-
vides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-
318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (citations omitted).
4. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note I, at 2-3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5909-11 ("If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights ... then
citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate
these rights in court.").
This Note discusses different fee-shifting statutes. It is, however, important
to note that the Supreme Court has said that all fee-shifting statutes should be
interpreted the same way. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641
(1992) ("[Olur caselaw construing what is a 'reasonable' fee applies uniformly to
all [fee-shifting statutes]."); Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,
491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989) (stating that similar language indicates similar
interpretation).
(1661)
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challenging violations of their rights generate benefits to society beyond
their personal recovery. 5 Because these societal benefits are of the type
government typically provides, courts and commentators often refer to
lawyers who perform civil rights enforcement functions by prosecuting
private suits as "private attorneys general."'6
Despite the longevity of the private attorney general concept, com-
peting policy considerations remain regarding the proper method for
computing statutory fees. On one hand, fees should provide compensa-
tion that is adequate to "level the playing field" by making statutory-fee
cases as financially appealing to lawyers as cases with guaranteed pay-
ment.7  On the other hand, fees should not generate an unnecessary
windfall for lawyers.8
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
statutory fee computation in City of Burlington v. Dague.9 Dague involved
a suit by residents of the City of Burlington, Vermont against the City
regarding the City's operation of a landfill.10 The residents prevailed on
all of their substantive claims and sought an award of statutory attor-
ney's fees, including a contingency multiplier. I I In Dague, the Supreme
Court held that "contingency multipliers," which attempt to compensate
private lawyers for providing both representation and financing over the
term of the litigation to their statutory fee clients, are neither required
5. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5911 ("The[] fee shifting provisions have been successful in enabling vigorous
enforcement of modern civil rights legislation, while at the same time limiting
the growth of the enforcement bureaucracy.").
6. Associated Indus. of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.)("Such (private enforcers], so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney
Generals"), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). The private attorney general
concept has been described as follows:
As most college sophomores know, the private attorney general is
someone who sues "to vindicate the public interest" by representing
collectively those who individually could not afford the costs of litiga-
tion; and, as every law student knows, our society places extensive reli-
ance upon such private attorneys general to enforce the federal
antitrust and securities laws, to challenge corporate self-dealing in de-
rivative actions, and to protect a host of other statutory policies.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney Geral: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 M. L. REv. 215, 216 (1983).
7. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5913 (fees awarded under statute to be "adequate to attract competent
counsel").
8. See id. (appropriate fee-shifting cases "do not produce windfalls to attor-
neys"); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (Delaware Valley I) (Fee-shifting statutes "were not designed
as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of lawyers."), rev'd on
other grounds on rehearing, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
10. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1346 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992). For a discussion of Dague's factual background, see infra
notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
11. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1347.
1662
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nor permissible under any of the fee-shifting statutes.1 2
This Note analyzes the Dague decision, beginning with a broad over-
view of fee-shifting mechanisms in Section II.13 It briefly discusses the
tension between the competing policies of providing adequate compen-
sation for a lawyer's statutory-fee work and preventing windfalls for
those attorneys. 14 Section II then reviews the pre-Dague caselaw on fee
shifting.15 This section explains the Supreme Court's prior attempt to
resolve the contingency enhancement question and discusses the effect
of that effort in the circuit courts of appeals. Section III discusses the
Dague opinion, setting forth the Court's reasoning and identifying the
major features of the opinion.16 This section also analyzes the Court's
underlying assumptions and critiques the Court's approach to the issue
of contingency enhancement. 17
Sections IV and V propose actions that both Congress and the
courts can take to remedy some of the problems caused by Dague. Sec-
tion IV suggests that Congress should act quickly to reassess the role of
fee-shifting.18 This section maintains that Congress should undertake a
reasoned and comprehensive review to consider both the policy and
procedural questions surrounding fee shifting. Section V submits sev-
eral permissible alternatives to contingency enhancement that courts
may use to increase fee awards where necessary in order to grant a fully
compensatory fee. 19
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Fee-Shifting Concepts
The basic mechanism of statutory fee shifting is not complex. The
12. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643-44. Throughout this Note, the terms "contin-
gency multiplier," "risk multiplier" and "contingency enhancement" are used
interchangeably. These terms refer to some type of additional fee that is to com-
pensate statutory-fee lawyers for the representation and financing they have pro-
vided for their clients.
13. For a discussion of the fee-shifting system, see infra notes 20-23 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the tension between fully compensatory fees and
attorney windfalls, see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Court's opinion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air, see infra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the impact of Delaware Valley in the circuit courts, see infra notes 47-
73 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Dague opinion, see infra notes 74-157 and ac-
companying text.
17. For a discussion of the Court's reasoning in Dague, see infra notes 86-
116 and accompanying text. For a critique of the Dague Court's approach, see
infra notes 127-57 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of proposed congressional action, see infra notes 158-
64 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the alternative approaches to contingency enhance-
ment, see infra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
1993] NOTE 1663
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"lodestar" method of fee computation is currently used by most courts
and has been endorsed by the United States Supreme Court.20 Under
the lodestar scheme, the district court arrives at an "objectively reason-
able" number of hours expended on the litigation, which the court then
multiplies by an "objectively reasonable" hourly rate to arrive at a fee
that approximates what a lawyer would charge a normal paying client. 2 1
At other times, courts have used methods involving analysis of a com-
plex list of factors or that allot some percentage of the amount awarded
20. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) ("The most useful
starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate.").
21. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit developed the
lodestar method in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I), vacated, 540 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1976). In Lindy 1, the Third Circuit noted that the method used to calculate
fees in a "common-fund" case-where plaintiffs' counsel generates a large mon-
etary recovery to be shared by other plaintiffs-was not appropriate in statutory
fee cases because no fund existed from which to draw the fees. Id at 168. The
court, adopting an "objective" approach, calculated a "reasonable" hourly rate
for attorneys of comparable skill and experience and multiplied it by a "reason-
able" number of hours expended on the litigation. Id. The lodestar method was
not the only approach to fee calculation existing at this time. See, e.g.,Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (articulat-
ing 12-factor test for determining reasonable fees). For a discussion of the John-
son factors, see infra notes 170-92 and accompanying text.
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court endorsed
the lodestar method of computation, although the Court did not expressly pro-
hibit use of other methods. Id. at 433. Hensley involved a suit brought in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against officials
of the Forensic Unit of the Fulton State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri. Id. at 426.
The plaintiffs prevailed on their claim that patients were not receiving constitu-
tionally adequate treatment and the district court awarded them attorneys' fees
of $133,332.25. Id. at 427-28. The fee award did not include the plaintiffs' re-
quested 30-50% enhancement for contingency. Id. at 428-29. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the attorneys' fee award
without opinion. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 664 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated,
461 U.S. 424 (1983).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the fee award because
the lower courts had not considered the relationship between the plaintiffs' de-
gree of success on the merits of their suit and the fee award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
440. The Court noted that while the lodestar was a reasonable starting point for
a fee award, "[t]here remain other considerations that may lead the district court
to adjust the fee upward or downward." Id. at 434. In particular, the Hensley
Court held that when computing a lodestar, a district court must first consider
whether the plaintiff has been successful on all prosecuted claims or only on
some. Id. at 440. If the plaintiff has not prevailed on a particular claim, "the
hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the
amount of a reasonable fee." Id.
4
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to the prevailing party22 in varying types of cases. 23 Despite the lode-
star method's apparent simplicity, practitioners remain concerned about
how courts arrive at a statutory fee because of the risk inherent in taking
a case in which they will not be paid until after the case is resolved and
only if the case is resolved in the plaintiff's favor.
B. The Supreme Court Perspective: The Delaware Valley Cases
In 1985, the Supreme Court first attempted to resolve the question
of contingency enhancement in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Councilfor Clean Air (Delaware Valley i).24 Unable to arrive at a consensus
on the contingency enhancement issue, the Court took the extraordi-
22. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The base requirement of fee-shifting statutes
is that a court may award fees only to a party prevailing on its claims. This
standard has been interpreted to mean that a party must prevail on claims that
are "reasonably related" to the hours compensated. See id at 434 (discussing
"results obtained" factor as being "particularly crucial where a plaintiff is
deemed (to have prevailed] even though [plaintiff] succeeded only on some of
his claims for relief").
23. See ArthurJ. Lachman, Note, Attorney's Fee Contingency Enhancements: To-
ward A Complete Incentive to Litigate Under Federal Fee-Shifting Statutes, 63 WASH. L.
REV. 469, 471-73 (1988) (identifying three basic methods of fee-shifting: "Lode-
star" approach, "Subjective Factors" approach and "Hybrid" approach).
24. 478 U.S. 546 (1986), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 483 U.S. 711(1987). The Supreme Court came late to the debate over contingency enhance-
ments, granting certiorari in Delaware Valley I after several circuits had developed
their own divergent viewpoints. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 474 U.S. 815 (1985). Before Delaware Valley I, the circuits
had taken divergent positions on the calculation of statutory-fee awards ranging
from a pure lodestar approach to a complex 12-factor process. See Wildman v.
Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 614 (1st Cir. 1985) (contingency multiplier
is appropriate given five-step evaluation: (1) what would lawyers have gotten if
their client had lost?; (2) what costs would lawyers have incurred if their client
had lost?; (3) were the lawyers completely dependent upon court for fees after
prevailing?; (4) whether the time case consumed required lawyers to compensate
associates and carry overhead expenses without any assurance of compensation;
and (5) whether other lawyers refused to take case because of lack of assurance
of compensation); Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Penn-
sylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 1985) (contingency multiplier allowable
where plaintiff's counsel identifies risk), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 478 U.S. 546
(1985), and rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 483 U.S. 711 (1987); LaDuke v.
Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1985) (upheld 20% contingency multi-
plier based on contingent nature of fee awards under the Equal Access to justice
Act); Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 620 (8th Cir. 1985) (contingency multi-
pliers appropriate); McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1393 (7th Cir.
1984) (contingency multiplier not permissible because it compensates for cases
not won); Jones v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 748 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1984)
(upheld multiplier because of pre-existing contingent fee arrangement); Laffey
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (contingency multi-
plier impermissible in all but most exceptional cases), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021
(1985); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974) (articulating 12-factor test to be used in computing statutory fees). For
cases Congress cited in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee
Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), see infra note 136.
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nary step of requesting reargument during the 1986 term limited to the
issue of contingency enhancements. 25 The Delaware Valley cases in-
volved a class action suit regarding the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania's compliance with provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA). 26
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found that the plaintiffs had "prevailed" and approved plaintiffs' peti-
tion for an award of attorneys' fees. 27 In determining an appropriate
attorneys' fee award, the court divided the litigation into discrete
phases. 28 In those phases where the court determined that the plaintiffs
had had a small chance of success, it granted a multiplier of two, doub-
ling the requested fees.2 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court's substantive hold-
ing and the attorneys' fee award.30
Despite the Supreme Court's express intent to resolve the contin-
gency enhancement question, neither the view that contingency en-
hancements are impermissible nor the view that such enhancements are
required attracted a majority in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley 11).31 Writing for a sharply divided
plurality, Justice White concluded that the plaintiffs had not demon-
strated extraordinary difficulty in finding counsel.3 2 Therefore, risk en-
25. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483
U.S. 711, 715 n.3 (1987) (Delaware Valley II).
26. Id. at 714. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had agreed, in a 1978
consent decree, to "establish a program for the inspection and maintenance of
vehicle emissions.., by August 1980." Id. However, the Commonwealth failed
to establish the agreed-upon programs and "protracted litigation ensued." Id.
After plaintiffs and the Commonwealth entered into a second consent decree in
May 1983, the plaintiffs petitioned for attorneys' fees and costs associated with
the enforcement litigation. Id.
27. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 581 F.
Supp. 1412, 1430 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 478 U.S. 546 (1985), and rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 483 U.S. 711(1987).
28. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 714.
29. Id. The district court divided the litigation into nine phases and
doubled the lodestar request for phases four, five and seven, finding that the
plaintiffs' risk of not prevailing was the greatest in those stages. Delaware Valley,
581 F. Supp. at 1431. The district court noted that "[t]he contingent nature of
plaintiff's success has been apparent throughout this litigation." Id.
30. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 762
F.2d 272, 282-83 (3d Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 478 U.S. 546 (1985), and
rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 483 U.S. 711 (1985).
31. 483 U.S. 711, 729-30 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Powell and Scalia found that the facts of the case did not warrant any
contingency enhancement. Id. Justice O'Connor concurred with Justice White
in the result but agreed with the dissenters, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens, that "Congress did not intend to foreclose consideration of
contingency in setting a reasonable fee under the fee-shifting provisions." Ida t
731 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 731 (White,J.).
1666 [Vol. 38: p. 1661
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hancement was not justified.33
Justice White articulated a three-part criticism of the approach to
risk enhancement the district court had taken and the Third Circuit had
affirmed: (1) there is great difficulty inherent in making an after-the-fact
determination of the risk of not prevailing from the outset; (2) basing
enhancement on the risk of a particular case allows, at least in theory,
for infinitely large multipliers in cases with small chances of prevailing
and penalizes the defendants with the least-clear liability; and (3) award-
ing contingency enhancement is contrary to Congress' intent because it
forces non-prevailing parties to compensate prevailing counsel for other
cases not won.3 4 Only three other Justices concurred, however, with
Justice White's opinion that "multipliers or other enhancement of a rea-
sonable lodestar fee to compensate for assuming the risk of loss is im-
permissible under the usual fee-shifting statutes."35
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, in dissent, took
a far more expansive view of contingency multipliers than did Justice
White's plurality.3 6 They would have allowed enhancement if the plain-
tiffs had demonstrated that: (1) their counsel had taken the case on a
contingent basis; (2) they had been unable to mitigate the risks of non-
payment in any way; and (3) other economic risks had been intensified
by the contingency of payment.3 7 The dissenters felt this broad scheme
33. Id. at 727 (White, J.). Justice White would have held that "[b]efore ad-justing for risk assumption, there should be evidence in the record, and the trial
court should so find that, without risk enhancement plaintiff would have faced
substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market."
Id. at 731 (White, J.).
34. Id. at 719-22 (White, J.). Justice White's criticisms of contingency fee
multipliers are, nearly verbatim, those the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit advanced in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
746 F.2d 4, 26-28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting contingency enhancement as un-
workable and unwarranted), cert denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985). Delaware Valley II,
483 U.S. at 719-22 (WhiteJ.).
35. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 727 (White, J.). Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Powell and Scalia would allow contingency enhancement in
only the most extreme circumstances, and, even in those situations, only up to
one-third of the lodestar. Id. at 730 (White, J.). They would have held that:
[I]f the trial court specifically finds that there was a real risk-of-not-pre-
vailing issue in the case, an upward adjustment of the lodestar may be
made, but, as a general rule, in an amount no more than one-third of
the lodestar. Any additional adjustment would require the most exacting
justification.
Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 740 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("An adjustment for contingency is
necessary if statutory fees are to be competitive with the private market and if
competent lawyers are to be attracted in their private practice to prosecute statu-
tory violations.").
37. Id. at 754 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters would have al-
lowed additional fee enhancement "because of the significant legal risks appar-
ent at the outset of the litigation and because of the importance of the case." Id.
at 755 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
16671993] NOTE
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was necessary "so that highly skilled lawyers will be available to vindi-
cate the statutory rights conferred by Congress."38
Justice O'Connor's separate opinion, concurring in the plurality
judgment but approving of the less-restrictive use of multipliers, became
the most important statement to emerge from Delaware Valley JJ.39 Jus-
tice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress did not
intend contingency multipliers to be available.40 Justice O'Connor did,
however, concur with Justice White's view that courts should only grant
enhancements for risk where the prevailing party needs an enhancement
in order to obtain counsel. 4 1
Justice O'Connor advocated a three-part approach that emphasized
the need for a consistent, non-arbitrary method for determining when
38. Id. at 755 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters would have re-
manded the case to the district court for detailed findings on the three factors
identified. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissenters rejected, at
least in part, the rationale the district court and the Third Circuit used to justify
the awarded multiplier. Id. at 755 n.18 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The dissent-
ing Justices stated that the defendant's "serious and persistent opposition," a
focus of the Third Circuit's analysis, could not justify a multiplier because the
"opposition" factor was subsumed in the lodestar's number of hours calculation.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, the dissenters recognized that the case
presented no novel or complex legal risks that would justify extraordinary en-
hancement. Id. at 755 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). They noted that the "respon-
dent's attorneys began this litigation in order to enforce a consent decree-a
situation that does not usually entail difficult legal risks." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
39. Id. at 731-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Following Delaware Valley II,
many circuits considered Justice O'Connor's position to be the state of the law
because O'Connor concurred, at least in theory, with the dissenters that multi-
pliers should be widely available. See Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 888 F.2d 975,
980-82 (3d Cir. 1989) (followingJustice O'Connor's position); Islamic Center v.
Starkville, 876 F.2d 465, 472-73 & n.35 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that virtually
every circuit considering issue after Delaware Valley II had adopted Justice
O'Connor's position); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1404 (4th Cir. 1987)(same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988); Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d
987, 991 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowed enhancement based on "risk and delay in pay-
ment inherent in [contingency] fee arrangements"). But see Martin v. University
of South Alabama, 911 F.2d 604, 611 (11 th Cir. 1990) (following neitherJustice
White nor Justice O'Connor; requiring showing that enhancement was neces-
sary to attract counsel in postjudgment phases of litigation, not in merits phase);
Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 553 (6th Cir. 1987) (followed Justice White in
requiring factual showing that enhancement needed to compensate for possibil-
ity of not prevailing).
In the wake of the Court's 4-1-4 split, most lower courts regarded the posi-
tions ofJustice O'Connor and the four dissenters to comprise a majority view.
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds .... ').
40. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 733 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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an adjustment is necessary. 42 First, and most importantly, Justice
O'Connor stated that the lower courts should determine "how [their]
particular market compensates for contingency."'43 Second, the fee ap-
plicant should bear the burden of demonstrating that the relevant mar-
ket provides incentives to take contingency cases.44 In Justice
O'Connor's opinion, any enhancement should be limited to that neces-
sary to attract competent counsel.45 Third, enhancement should not be
based on the prevailing party's risk of not winning the particular case at
hand.48
C. Risk Multipliers After Delaware Valley II
Following the fractured decision in Delaware Valley II, most lower
federal courts searching for meaningful guidance on whether and when
to enhance a fee award to account for contingency regarded the concur-
42. Id. at 732 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 733 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor,
this determination should be controlling for future cases unless a subsequent
prevailing party can show that it is no longer accurate. Id. (O'Connor, J., con-
curring). Moreover, "[d]eterminations involving different markets should also
comport with each other.... [An] applicant should be able to point to differ-
ences in ... markets that would justify ... different rates of compensation." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Requiring the fee applicant to show
how the relevant market compensates for contingency is consistent with the
Court's other fee shifting burdens of proof. A fee applicant bears the burden of
showing that both the number of hours claimed and the rate requested are "rea-
sonable." See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (noting that
"fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and doc-
umenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates") (quoted in Penn-
sylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 733
(1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
45. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 733 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor notes that this burden of proof is the same as that borne by the fee
applicant for all aspects of the fee petition. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984) (stating that "[ifi the applicant
for a fee has carried his burden of showing that the claimed rate and number of
hours are reasonable, the resulting product is presumed to be the reasonable
fee"); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (noting that "the fee applicant bears the burden of
establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours
expended and hourly rates").
46. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 734 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This
"case-specific" risk method was the one the district court used and the Third
Circuit adopted in Delaware Valley. For a discussion of the district court and
Third Circuit's approach to enhancement, see supra notes 28-30 and accompany-
ing text.
Justice O'Connor suggested that refusing to grant enhancement based on
case-specific risk serves two functions. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 734
(O'Connor, J., concurring). First, it recognizes that lawyers refuse statutory fee
cases based on factors, such as delay in payment, that are unrelated to case-
specific risk. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Second, it prevents courts from
having to answer an impossible factual question at the end of litigation: what was
the risk of not prevailing at the outset? Id (O'Connor, J', concurring).
1993] NOTE 1669
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ring opinion ofJustice O'Connor as representative of the Court's think-
ing.47 For example, in Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp. (Blum J),48 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Delaware Valley II.49
Blum I involved a group of chemists who brought suit against Witco
Chemical Corporation under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).50 After the chemists had prevailed on their ADEA claims,
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey awarded
attorney's fees in the amount of $135,977.40. 51 The Third Circuit sub-
sequently reversed the award of a contingency multiplier, reasoning inter
alia that the district court had not made the specific factual findings con-
cerning how the NewJersey legal market compensated private attorneys
for contingency cases that Delaware Valley II required. 52
The Blum I opinion began by noting that "[t]he 4-1-4 division [in
Delaware Valley II] makes it difficult to identify the reasoning or derive
guidance from the various alliances the [Supreme Court] formed to
reach its holdings."53
The court's opinion identified five areas of difficulty in implement-
ingJustice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Delaware Valley H.5 4 First,
a contingency multiplier cannot be based on the difficulty of the case.55
Second, the plaintiff must provide expert testimony or a study to estab-
lish the way in which the relevant market treats contingency cases as a
whole.56 Third, to be sufficient, a study will have to include all contin-
47. For a discussion of the application ofJustice O'Connor's opinion in the
circuit courts, see infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
48. 829 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 380.
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The chemists, all of
whom were over the age of 55, claimed Witco unlawfully discharged them when
it closed its research division while it retained other, younger employees. Blum I,
829 F.2d at 370-71. Witco claimed that it retained the other chemists because
they were connected with an ongoing project, while those discharged had nar-
row specialties that would "make retention elsewhere in the company
[in]feasible." Id. at 371.
51. Blum I, 829 F.2d at 372.
52. dE at 379. The Third Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's
finding of age-based discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991). Blum I, 829
F.2d at 379.
53. Blum I, 829 F.2d at 380. The Third Circuit recognized the confusion
Delaware Valley II caused and stated that it intended for its opinion to serve as "a
blueprint for an evidentiary hearing [and] ... findings that will satisfy the [Dela-
ware Valley I1] rule." Id. The Blum I court attempted to "give some guidance and
to identify some important issues and suggest ways that a record might be devel-
oped." Id.
54. Blum I, 829 F.2d at 380-82.
55. Id. at 380 ("[Ihe plaintiffs must develop an evidentiary presentation
on remand. If they fail, they must suffer the proverbial 'Scotch verdict'-not
proven.' ").
56. Id. "It may also be that an expert economist will be required, even one
1670 [Vol. 38: p. 1661
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss5/7
gency cases, not just those involving fee-shifting statutes.5 7 Fourth,
once the court has determined how its particular market compensates
for contingency, that determination must control future cases within the
same market. 58 Fifth, "Justice O'Connor's conclusion that any differ-
ence in fee structures of contingency versus assured hourly rate cases
must be reflected in an upward adjustment of the lodestar should be
tempered by the consideration of the fee necessary to attract competent
counsel." 59 Demonstrating the many questions left in the wake of Dela-
ware Valley II, the Blum I court merely identified these five concerns, pro-
viding no further guidance on how the district courts should act to
alleviate them.60
Other courts, however, declined to follow Justice O'Connor's con-
currence. For example, in Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial
Center,61 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ex-
pressly adopted Justice White's plurality opinion in Delaware Valley II and
rejected Justice O'Connor's approach. 62 Plaintiff Homeward Bound, an
association of parents whose children resided in the defendant state in-
stitution for the developmentally disabled, brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. 65 The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's operation of the home violated
their children's various constitutional and statutory rights. 6 4 Following
able to develop some kind of econometric model.... that [can] determine[] the
mathematical relationship between hourly rate and contingency." Id. How-
ever, the court noted that even such an intricate model would not fully satisfy
the requisite evidentiary standard because "it says nothing about the question
whether the multiple is necessary to attract competent counsel." Id. at 381.
57. d Chief Judge Becker, writing for the Blum I court, found that "[it
does not appear that Justice O'Connor... contemplated that the class of cases
to be studied be anything less than all contingency cases in a given geographic
market, including personal injury cases, which constitute the biggest group." Id.
58. Id. The Blum I court stated that "perhaps the district court will wish to
appoint a special or even a standing master to develop findings about contin-
gency cases in its geographic area that can be used in all cases, or at least as a
point of departure." Id. The court noted, in passing, that such a study might
present due process problems if those who will later be affected by its outcome
are unable to participate in its formulation. Id.
59. Id. at 382. This element is intended to interject a note of "realism" into
the class-based contingency analysis, which, "despite its theoretical integrity,
may result in too high a multiplier." IA at 381-82.
60. Id. at 380-82.
61. 963 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1992).
62. Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1358 ("[W]e reaffirm the standard ...
approved of by the Delaware Valley II plurality, and we decline to adopt Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Delaware Valley II as the law of this Circuit.").
63. Id. at 1354. The plaintiffs sought both injunctive and declaratory relief.
Id.
64. See id. at 1354 n.3. The court summarized the broadly worded com-
plaint: "[p]laintiffs alleged violations of the First, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and sought relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also claimed violations of The Rehabilitation Act of
19931 NOTE 1671
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protracted litigation, the district 'court found for the plaintiffs and ap-
proved their lodestar request.6 5 However, the court denied the plain-
tiffs' application for a contingency enhancement. 66
Judge Baldock, writing for a panel of the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the
district court's denial of a contingency enhancement. 67 The court held
that Justice O'Connor's position in Delaware Valley II was not based on
sufficiently narrow grounds to constitute a majority under the plurality
judgment rule set forth in Marks v. United States.68 Under the Marks rule,
only the views of those justices concurring in the judgment on the nar-
rowest possible grounds are regarded as precedential. 69 Relying onjus-
tice White's plurality opinion in Delaware Valley II and a prior Tenth
Circuit case, 70 the court held that risk multipliers were to be available
only in "exceptional cases" and should be based on the risk inherent in
a particular case and not on a class-wide analysis. 7 ' However, courts
should view such multipliers cautiously and should only award them in
cases where "prior to the litigation, the attorney for the prevailing party
was confronted with a 'real risk of not prevailing.' "72 The court further
held that the prevailing party must show that the risk of not prevailing
created an inability to find counsel in the relevant market absent some
multiplier.73
1973, Title XIX of The Social Security Act, and Education of the Handicapped
Act." Id. at 1354 n.3 (citations omitted).
65. Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1354.
66. Id. The district court, following Justice O'Connor's approach in Dela-
ware Valley II, denied the multiplier because the plaintiffs had presented no evi-
dence showing how the relevant market treated contingency cases and because
the plaintiffs' risk of not prevailing in this particular case was not high from the
outset. Id.
67. Id. at 1360.
68. Id. at 1358 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
69. Id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). For a dis-
cussion of the impact of Supreme Court opinions when there is no clear major-
ity, so-called Marks majorities, see supra note 39.
70. Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1360. The court held that its opinion in
Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 558 (10th Cir. 1983) that contingency enhance-
ment must be based on the "risk presented by the particular case at hand," was
not affected by Delaware Valley II. Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1356 n.6.
71. Id. at 1360. The court reaffirmed that multipliers for contingency are
available "notwithstanding that four members of the Supreme Court have stated
that such enhancements are never appropriate." Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Del-
aware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 727 (1987)). For a
discussion of the positions of individual justices in Delaware Valley II, see supra
note 31.
72. Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1360 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 729-30 (1985)). This "risk
of not prevailing" is based on a two-part inquiry: (1) to what extent was the
relevant law unsettled at the time the suit was filed and (2) to what extent was
the suit's outcome dependant on the resolution of a disputed material fact. Id.
73. Id. "This [difficulty] may be shown by evidence that the plaintiff en-
countered actual difficulty in securing counsel... [or] by showing that lawyers in
1672
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III. CITY OF BURLINGTON v. DAGUE
The Court's most recent statement on statutory fees had its roots in
a dispute between residents of Burlington, Vermont and the City of Bur-
lington (the City) regarding the City's operation of a landfill. Ernest
Dague and his neighbors lived next to a landfill owned and operated by
the City.7 4 In October of 1985, Dague brought suit against the City in
the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, alleging
that the operation of the landfill violated various provisions of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 75 the Clean Water Act
(CWA) 76 and the Vermont Groundwater Protection Law.7 7 After a
bench trial, the district court found for Dague on virtually all of his
claims. 78 The court granted Dague's petition for an award of attorney's
fees pursuant to the fee-shifting provisions of the RCRA7 9 and the
CWA. 80 The court awarded Dague lodestar fees in the amount of
$198,027.50 and costs of $10,929.66.81 The court also increased the
the relevant market, generally will not take cases on contingency absent some
guarantee of an enhancement." Id. (citations omitted).
74. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1348 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
75. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6925, 6930,
6945 (1988). Dague claimed that "the operation of the landfill generally harmed
the environment, and specifically damaged [his] propertly], by generating meth-
ane gas, wind-blown debris, and hazardous waste." Dague, 935 F.2d at 1346.
76. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1317 (1988) (prohibiting dis-
charge of natural or artificial pollutants into water source without permit); 33
U.S.C. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (same), cited in Dague, 935 F.2d at 1346.
77. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1410 (Supp. 1992) (abolishing common-law
doctrine of absolute ownership of groundwater and providing cause of action
for "unreasonable harm caused by another person withdrawing, diverting or al-
tering the character or quality of groundwater"), cited in Dague, 935 F.2d at
1346.
78. See Dague, 935 F.2d at 1349. Specifically, the district court found that
the City had violated the RCRA prohibitions against open dumping. Id. at 1346.
The City had also violated § 6945(a) of the RCRA by generating methane gas,
which polluted United States waters without a permit. Id. at 1349. Further, the
"landfill may have presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment, and therefore, its continued operation violated [the
RCRA]." Id. The City had also violated the CWA by "discharging pollutants
from a point source... without authorization." Id. Lastly, the City violated the
Vermont Groundwater Protection Law "by altering the character and quality of
the groundwater beneath and north of the landfill." Id.
79. Id. at 1346 (citing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) ("The court ... may award costs of litigation(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or sub-
stantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.")).
80. Id. (citing Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988 & Supp. III
1991) ("The court... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attor-
ney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.")).
81. Id. at 1347.
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lodestar by twenty-five percent to account for the risk involved in the
case, yielding total fees of $258,464.03.82
The City appealed both the district court's findings on the merits
and the award of attorney's fees.85 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's findings on the merits
and upheld the lodestar calculation, including the twenty-five percent
multiplier.8 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the issue
of whether the lower court's grant of an enhancement for contingency
was permissible under federal fee-shifting statutes.85
A. Narrative Analysis
The fee-shifting provisions at issue in City of Burlington v. Dague8 6
were those incorporated in the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).87 Justice Scalia, writing
for the six-justice majority, began by noting that the Court's prior
caselaw indicated that all fee-shifting provisions should be interpreted
similarly.88 The particular fee-shifting provision before the Court was,
therefore, largely irrelevant.8 9 Justice Scalia reiterated the Court's be-
lief that the lodestar method produces reasonable fees, noting that it has
"become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence. "90 Fur-
ther, he stated the "strong presumption" that the lodestar method's rea-
sonable hours multiplied by reasonable hourly rate calculation
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1356-60. The panel was comprised of Circuit Judges Newman
and Pratt and Judge Griesa of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation. Id. at 1346. Judge Pratt's unani-
mous opinion held that: (1) Dague was a prevailing party and his victory was not
de minimis; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not reducing the
lodestar to account for limited success; and (3) the 25% contingency enhance-
ment was warranted because Dague would otherwise have had difficulty finding
competent counsel and "the risk of not prevailing was substantial." Id. at 1357-
60. In upholding the enhancement for contingency, the Second Circuit did not
recognize any opinion in Delaware Valley II as controlling and relied expressly on
its own precedent in Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d 295
(2d Cir. 1987). Dague, 935 F.2d at 1360.
85. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992). The Court granted
certiorari because the "question [was] essentially identical to the one [it] ad-
dressed, but did not resolve, in [Delaware Valley I]]." Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2639
(citation omitted).
86. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
87. Id. at 264 1. For a discussion of the fee-shifting provisions of the RCRA
and the CWA, see supra notes 79-80.
88. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion. Id. at
2639. Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice Stevens, and Justice
O'Connor dissented separately. Id.
89. For a discussion of the interpretive similarity of fee-shifting provisions,
see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
90. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.
1674 [Vol. 38: p. 1661
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generates, for nearly all purposes, a "reasonable fee." 91
Turning generally to the question of what role an enhancement for
contingency should serve within the fee-shifting system, Justice Scalia
suggested that the risk borne by an attorney is the product of two fac-
tors: "(1) the legal and factual merits of the claim, and (2) the difficulty
of establishing those merits." 92 Of these factors, the latter is subsumed
in the lodestar calculation, either in an increased number of hours or a
higher hourly rate for more experienced counsel.93 Justice Scalia rea-
soned that the legal merits factor should not play any role in determin-
ing fee awards and is, therefore, not reflected in the lodestar
calculation. 94 Considering legal merits "would encourage meritorious
claims to be brought, but only at the social cost of indiscriminately en-
couraging nonmeritorious claims to be brought as well." 95
The Court next rejected the approach taken by Justice O'Connor in
her concurring opinion in Delaware Valley 11.96 The Court found two ma-
jor faults with Justice O'Connor's position that enhancements for con-
tingency should be based on how the relevant market treats all
contingency cases as a class. First, the Court found Justice O'Connor's
approach to be inherently contradictory. 97 Justice O'Connor would re-
quire a prevailing party to demonstrate that, absent enhancement, he or
she would have had substantial difficulty finding counsel, and yetJustice
O'Connor would forbid enhancement based on the risks associated with
the particular case. 98 According to the Dague majority, the unavailability
of counsel is inextricably linked to the riskiness of a particular case.99
SecondJustice O'Connor's approach, which requires looking to the
91. Id (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 483 U.S.
711 (1987)).
92. Id.
93. Id. Justice Scalia stated that considering this factor in assessing a multi-
plier "amounts to double counting" because the difficulty in establishing a suit's
merits is already reflected in the basic lodestar calculation. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2642. Justice Scalia explained:
Assume, for example, two claims, one with underlying merit of 20%,
the other of 80%. Absent any contingency enhancement, a contingent-
fee attorney would prefer to take the latter, since he is four times more
likely to be paid. But with a contingency enhancement, this preference
will disappear: the enhancement for the 20% claim would be a multi-
plier of 5 (100/20), which is quadruple the 1.25 multiplier (100/80)
that would attach to the 80%o claim.
Id Moreover, the legal merits factor would require considering a multiplier in
every case because no suit has a 100% chance of success. Id at 2641.
96. Id. at 2642. "Dague urges that we adopt the approach set forth in the
Delaware Valley II concurrence. We decline to do so, first and foremost because
we do not see how it can intelligibly be applied." Id.
97. Id. at 2642.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2641.
1993] NOTE 1675
15
Kravitz: Denying the Devil His Due: Contingency Fee Multipliers after City
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
"market treatment" of contingency cases is unworkable in many statu-
tory-fee cases because no relevant market exists.100 Many statutory-fee
cases, especially those seeking equitable (non-monetary) relief, would
not be brought if not for fee-shifting statutes.' 0 ' In those cases, there-
fore, the only market is one artificially created by fee-shifting statutes. 102
Moreover, even in cases where there is a relevant class to analyze, that
"average" class treatment is irrelevant.103 Lawyers faced with a contin-
gent fee case do not compare it to win-or-lose fee cases, but rather eval-
uate its particular merits.' 0 4 Lawyers set fees based on their chance of
success. 105 Moving away from Justice O'Connor's approach in Delaware
Valley II, Justice Scalia could find no other method "by which contin-
gency enhancement, if adopted, could be restricted to fewer than all
contingent-fee cases." 106
Justice Scalia advanced two reasons for believing that enhancement
for risk does not comport with the legislative intent behind fee-shifting
statutes or the Court's other fee-shiftingjurisprudence. First, only "pre-
vailing parties" can recover fees at all.' 0 7 Therefore, even a "success-
ful" party can only recover fees for those claims within the litigation
upon which the party actually prevailed.' 0 8 Because contingent fee at-
torneys operate by "pooling" the risk of numerous cases, awarding a fee
similar to that available in the general contingent fee market compen-
100. Id at 2642.
101. Id.
102. Id. "[L]ooking to that [artificial] 'market' for the meaning of fee-shift-
ing is obviously circular. Our decrees would follow the 'market,' which in turn is
based on our decrees." Id. This reasoning is essentially the same as that of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See King v.
Palmer, 906 F.2d 762, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Williams, J., concurring) ("I see the
judicial judgment as defining the market, not vice versa."), vacated, 950 F.2d 771(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom King v. Ridley, 112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992).
103. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2642. This is because the "contingent risk of a
case ... depends principally upon its particular merits." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The Court stated that:
Contingency enhancement calculated on any class-wide basis, there-
fore, guarantees at best... that those cases within the class that have
the class-average chance of success will be compensated according to
what the 'market' requires to produce the services, and that all cases
having above-class-average chance of success will be overcompensated.
Id.
106. Id. at 2642-43.
107. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). For a discussion of the
"prevailing party" standard, see supra note 22.
108. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424(1983) (setting standard for determining who is prevailing party for purposes of
fee-shifting)). This prevailing party concept is the baseline requirement for an
award of fees under any fee-shifting statute. Under all such statutes, with the
exception of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, only a plaintiff may be a prevailing party. See S.
REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 4 n.4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5912
(stating that defendants may be awarded fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
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sates attorneys for other cases not won against other parties.' 0 9 The
Court viewed this as violating the most basic requirement for fee-shift-
ing-that a party receive fees only for claims prevailed upon." 0
Second, Justice Scalia asserted that the "contingent-fee" model is
incompatible with the lodestar model."' Grafting enhancement factors
from the contingent-fee model onto the lodestar model would create an
awkward and inequitable system. 112 Under such a "hybrid" model, risk
could be used to increase a lodestar, but absence of risk could not be
used to reduce it.11s
Finally, the Court rejected contingency multipliers because multi-
pliers tend to generate an undesirable amount of "satellite litiga-
tion."1 1 4 Beyond the theoretical concerns about incentives and
different models, the Court also expressed an underlying concern for
the "administrability" of fee-shifting."15 This interest in adminis-
trability, Justice Scalia suggests, has been the motivating factor behind
the Court's acceptance of the objective lodestar model. ' 16
In dissent, Justices Blackmun and Stevens identified two overriding
principles that require the availability of a contingency multiplier. First,
the legislative history of fee-shifting statutes and the Court's prior
caselaw require that a "reasonable" fee be one that is fully compensa-
tory." 7 Second, "professional standards" permit an attorney who takes
109. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643. This concept of risk "pooling" means that
for a contingent fee attorney "cases that turn out to be successful pay for the
time... gambled on those that did not." Id.
110. Id.
11. Id. The Court noted that "we have generally turned away from the
contingent-fee model ... to the lodestar model." Id. (quoting Venegas v. Mitch-
ell, 495 U.S. 82, 87 (1990)).
112. Id.
113. Id. ("To engraft this feature onto the lodestar model would be to con-
coct a hybrid scheme that resorts to the contingent-fee model to increase a fee
award but not to reduce it.").
114. Id. The Court first used the term "satellite litigation" in connection
with statutory fees in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). The Hensley
Court was concerned that fee-shifting "not result in a second major litigation."
461 U.S. at 437. The Dague majority argued that "[c]ontingency enhancement is
a feature inherent in the contingent-fee model .... [It] is therefore not consis-
tent with our general rejection of the contingent-fee model for fee awards, nor is
it necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee." Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643.
115. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643. For a discussion of "administrability," see
infra note 130.
116. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643. "Contingency enhancement would make
the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and
hence more litigable." Id.
117. Id. at 2644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Citing the Court's opinion in
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286 (1989), Justice Blackmun noted that a
reasonable fee is one "calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in
the relevant market." Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see
also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (stating that reasonable fee must be one that fully
compensates).
167719931 NOTE
17
Kravitz: Denying the Devil His Due: Contingency Fee Multipliers after City
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1661
a case on a contingency basis to be compensated more highly than an
attorney certain to recover a fee.' 8 "The Court," writes Justice Black-
mun, "does not deny these principles. It simply refuses to draw the con-
clusion that follows ineluctably"-that if the market provides incentives
for contingency, so must a "fully compensatory" statutory fee." 19
Justice Blackmun next looked to the purpose behind fee-shifting
statutes. He stated that the entire notion of private civil rights enforce-
ment was tied to the availability of skilled private counsel.' 20 Specifi-
cally, fee-shifting provisions reflect congressional concerns that: (1)
many potential plaintiffs lack the resources necessary to hire an attorney
and (2) many civil rights suits generate no monetary recovery from
which to pay an attorney.' 2 '
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, reasserted the theme of her concur-
ring opinion in Delaware Valley II.122 O'Connor again advocated the use
of a class-wide analysis, suggesting that the majority opinion is flawed
because it focuses almost exclusively on multipliers granted for the risk
inherent in a particular case. 125 Instead, she asserted that a court
should require evidence showing that competent counsel will avoid fee-
shifting cases without the promise of some enhancement. 124 Justice
118. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting
Justices cited to a provision of the American Bar Association Code of Profes-
sional Conduct to demonstrate that higher fees in contingency cases are the
rule, not the exception. a L at 2644 n.3 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.5(a)(8) (1992) (allowing for contin-
gency-fee arrangements).
119. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The conclusion
that Justice Blackmun referred to is that if the relevant "market" compensates
for risk, then "reasonable" market-based statutory fees must do likewise. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Congress' purpose in adopting fee-
shifting provisions was to strengthen the enforcement of selected federal laws by
ensuring that private persons ... could retain competent counsel.").
121. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that these two con-
cerns combine in the notion that if statutory rights cases are less profitable than
win-or-lose fee cases, only less competent attorneys-judged so because they are
not occupied by other cases-will take statutory rights cases. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). This group of sub-standard lawyers, combined with the relatively
few public-interest law projects is not sufficient to enforce the myriad of civil
rights cases that develop. Id. at 2644-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Delaware Valley II, see supra notes 39-46 and accom-
panying text.
123. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2649 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (voting to reverse
lower court's award of multiplier and remand for reconsideration because "it
was error to base the degree of enhancement on case-specific factors").
124. Id at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority criticizes this
class-wide calculation because it would be based on imperfect data. Id. at 2642.
However,Justice O'Connor points out that courts are often called to "make eco-
nomic determinations on less-than-perfect data," such as in inverse condemna-
tion and antitrust cases. Id. at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Nevertheless,
Justice O'Connor asserted that courts must make imperfect calculations in order
1678
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O'Connor argued, as she did in Delaware Valley II, that a fee that will
attract competent counsel is "reasonable." 125 If a contingency enhance-
ment is necessary to attract competent counsel, then it, too, must be
"reasonable" and permissible under federal fee-shifting statutes.1 26
B. Critical Analysis
By refusing contingency multipliers in all cases, the Dague majority
opts for the most convenient solution. Justice Scalia's majority opinion
seeks predictability at all costs. Amidst the comfort that certainty brings,
however, lingering doubts remain about whether the Court has placed
the form of statutory fee-shifting before its substance. Will choosing the
most easily administered solution remove an essential incentive for pri-
vate enforcement of civil rights? In the end, the Court rejects contin-
gency enhancement because of the myriad problems it associates with
it.12 7 However, many of those problems are created by the Court's per-
sistence in characterizing contingency multipliers as only those granted
to account for the risk inherent in the particular case at hand instead of
as market-based incentives for successful lawyers to take statutory-fee
cases. 1
2 8
1. Administrability
The Dague majority is consumed by administrability. It rejects en-
hancement based on how the market treats contingency cases as a class-
Justice O'Connor's position in Delaware Valley I/-because it "do[es] not
see how it can intelligibly be applied."' 29 It rejects all other approaches
to realize Congress' purpose in enacting those statutes. Id (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Moreover, the "initial (computational] hurdles would be overcome as
the enhancements appropriate to various markets became settled in the district
courts and courts of appeals," according to justice O'Connor. Id. (O'Connor,J,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor concluded that any harm that would result from
this initial inaccuracy would be more than offset by the benefits that would result
from increased willingness on the part of lawyers to take statutory fee cases. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("reasonable fee should be one that
would attract competent counsel").
126. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Contingency enhancement, however,
must be based upon concrete (if incomplete) data showing that private counsel
in the relevant market require additional economic incentives to take the risks
associated with a statutory fee case. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor would vacate the lower court's fee award and remand for further fac-
tual findings because the record did not contain "market-specific support for the
25% enhancement figure." Id. at 2649 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127. For a discussion of the problems leading to the Court's rejection of
contingency enhancement, see supra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of the Dague majority's view of the role of risk, see
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
129. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2642. The majority's inability to apply class-based
enhancement in a satisfactory way was its "first and foremost" reason for re-
jecting that approach. Id.
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because "the interest in ready administrability ... and the related inter-
est in avoiding burdensome satellite litigation . . . counsel strongly
against adoption of contingency enhancement."130 There is, doubtless,
something appealing about such a clear-cut, bright-line rule as "en-
hancement for contingency is not permitted."1 31
However, as Justices Blackmun and Stevens point out in dissent,
"speculation that [contingency] enhancement determinations would be
'burdensome' does not speak to the issue whether they are required by
the fee-shifting statutes."' 3 2 Fee-shifting statutes have always had one
purpose-"to strengthen the enforcement of selected federal laws by
ensuring that private persons seeking to enforce those laws could retain
competent counsel."'13 Admittedly, neither the language of the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988,13 4 nor its legisla-
tive history explicitly mandates contingency enhancement.' 3 5 Congress
130. Id. at 2643. This concern with administrability is identified as the ele-
ment that "has underlain [the Court's] adoption of the lodestar approach." Id.
The majority asserts that contingency enhancement would lead to protracted
litigation because it "would make the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary[and] hence more unpredictable." Id.
Justice Scalia's concern for administrability crosses jurisprudential bounda-
In a ranging from habeas corpus procedure to First Amendment rights,
Justice Scalia has advocated positions that are easy to administer. See, e.g.,
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1963 (1991) (majority criticized
Justice Scalia for "sacrific[ing] sound constitutional analysis for the appearance
of administrability"); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, I ll S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991) (Jus-
tice Scalia adopts habeas corpus presumption because it "assists . .
administrability.").
131. See Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643.
132. Id. at 2647 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The dissenters note that even if
the majority's "satellite litigation" argument were valid, Dague is an unlikely case
to illustrate that point because "the issue of enhancement hardly occupied
center stage in the fees portion of this litigation." Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
In fact, contingency enhancement only became an issue when the Supreme
Court granted certiorari "limited to [that] question alone." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Perhaps the dissenters recognize that Dague was not the appropriate
case with which to resolve the question of contingency enhancement because
that issue was not foremost in the case. Moreover, the issue would become less
burdensome if Justice O'Connor's class-based enhancement position were
adopted because "the amount by which fees should be increased would quickly
become settled in the various district courts." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
For a discussion ofJustice O'Connor's position in Dague, see supra notes 122-26
and accompanying text.
133. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No.
1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913).
134. For the text of § 1988, see supra note 3.
135. For the legislative history of § 1988, see generally S. REP. No. 1011,
supra note 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.G.C.A.N. 5908. Both proponents and oppo-
nents of contingency enhancement recognize this lack of explicit congressional
guidance. See, e.g., Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 723 ("The disagreement among
the Circuits and commentators indicates that Congress has not clearly directed
or authorized multipliers or enhancements for assuming the risk of loss."); Id. at
737-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress required only that
court-awarded fees "be ... at a rate that is basically competitive with what the
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss5/7
1993] NoTE 1681
did, however, cite two cases in section 1988's legislative history that per-
mitted enhancement.' 3 6 These citations may be interpreted as Con-
gress' implicit endorsement of contingency enhancement.'8 7
Moreover, Congress' dictate that court-awarded fees be "adequate
to attract competent counsel, but ... not produce windfalls to attor-
neys"' 8 8 leads to the conclusion that contingency enhancement should
be available if such enhancement is necessary to attract competent coun-
sel.' 3 9 The Dague majority either discounts or ignores the weight of evi-
lawyer is able to earn in other cases"); see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Supreme
Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986 Terms: Economics, Ethics, and Ex Ante
Analysis, 1 GEo.J. LEGAL ETmics 621, 633 n.52 (1988) ("mhe intent of Congress
is controlling if clear, which the Court's 4-1-4 division in Delaware Valley II sug-
gests it was not.").
136. The Senate Report accompanying § 1988 cites only four cases as hav-
ing applied "[t]he appropriate standards": Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680
(N.D. Cal. 1974), aft'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436
U.S. 547 (1978); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. 9444 (C.D. Cal.
1974); and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483(W.D.N.C. 1975). S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913.
Two of these four cases refer to some sort of contingency enhancement.
The Johnson court hints at contingency in at least five of its twelve "subjective
factors": the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case, the attorney's customary fee, whether the attorney's fee is fixed or
contingent, the "undesirability" of the case and fee awards in similar cases.
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. Similarly, in Stanford Daily, the court granted an
increase in the lodestar "to reflect the fact that the attorneys' compensation...
was contingent in nature." Stanford Daily, 64 F.R.D. at 686.
137. There is, however, a competing viewpoint. At least one author has
suggested that the Senate's citations to Johnson and Stanford Daily cannot reason-
ably support an endorsement of contingency enhancement. See James D. Kole,
Note, Nonpayment Risk Multipliers: Incentives or Windfalls?, 53 U. CH. L. Rv. 1074,
1086-88 (1986). Kole further suggests that:
mhe rationale offered in [Stanford Daily] for allowing contingency bo-
nuses is impossible to reconcile with the other statements of Congres-
sional intent in the Fees Act. In Stanford Daily, the district court
awarded an enhancement because it "insures that counsel are compen-
sated not only for their successful efforts but also for unsuccessful
litigation."
Id. at 1087-88 (footnote omitted). Kole believes that the Stanford Daily court's
reasoning cannot support contingency enhancement because this "risk pooling"
argument is precluded by the prevailing party limitation. Id. at 1088. For a dis-
cussion of the prevailing party limitation and risk pooling, see supra notes 107-
10 and accompanying text & infra note 149.
138. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5913.
139. See Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that
contingency enhancement is mandated because anything less would not be
"fully compensatory"); Delaware Valley 11, 438 U.S. at 737 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that "unless the fee reimbursement [is] 'full and complete,' . . .
statutory rights [will] be meaningless because they would remain largely unen-
forced"); John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE
LJ. 473, 480 (1981) ("A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and
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dence showing that, absent compensation for risk, private practitioners
necessarily avoid contingent-fee cases because of the risk of not
prevailing. 14 0
It is worthwhile to recall Congress' warning that "[i]f our civil rights
laws are not to become mere hollow pronouncements... we must main-
tain the traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases." 14 1
If, as seems evident, private attorneys are unwilling or unable to take
statutory-fee cases, the entire system of private enforcement of rights is
threatened. Many observers and several members of the Supreme Court
believe that the elimination of enhancements for contingency creates
just such a threat.' 42 It stands to reason, therefore, that if a fee peti-
provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is
paid only for the second of those functions."); The Supreme Court - Leading Cases,
101 HARv. L. REv. 119, 297 (1987) (stating that "a contingency premium that
increases the lodestar is not an undeserved subsidy[,] ... it is compensation that
the attorney expects, and deserves, for assuming the risk of nonpayment").
140. See, e.g., Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 740 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)("An adjustment for contingency is necessary if... competent lawyers are to be
attracted in their private practice to prosecute statutory violations."); Leubsdorf,
supra note 139, at 474 ("The contingency bonus affects the level of private litiga-
tion and can be of crucial importance in deciding how many rights are privately
enforced."); ArthurJ. Lachman, Note, Attorney's Fee Contingency Enhancements: To-
ward A Complete Incentive to Litigate Under Federal Fee-Shifting Statutes, 63 WASH. L.
REV. 469, 481 & n.85 (1988) ("Unless compensation under fee-shifting statutes
is complete, private attorneys will not take public interest cases outside their
limited pro bono practices.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
3 (1976) & Brief for Amicus Curiae Twelve Small Private Civil Rights Law Firms
in Support of Respondents at 6-29, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (No. 85-5)).
141. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5913. Since Congress passed the first fee-shifting statute in 1870, Congress has
delegated the enforcement of statutory civil rights to private attorneys. See id. at
3-5 (noting that "the effects of such [statutory] fee awards are ancillary and inci-
dent to securing compliance with these [civil rights] laws, and that fee awards are
an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance").
142. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 139, at 474 ("The contingency bonus
affects the level of private litigation and can be of crucial importance in deciding
how many rights are privately enforced"); The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, supra
note 139, at 298 (noting that difficulty or inability to obtain contingency en-
hancement "make citizens' suits less attractive to attorneys"); Kole, Note, supra
note 137, at 1074 (stating that "the level of fee awards directly affects the
number of civil rights cases litigated"); Lachman, Note, supra note 140, at 481-82(noting that "[i]f attorneys must choose between ... a case in which compensa-
tion is regularly received as services are rendered and litigation under a fee-
shifting statute where compensation will be received only at the end of the litiga-
tion ... [and] only if their client prevails, most will choose the noncontingent
employment").
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor have asserted
in dissent that creating uncertainty about the availability of contingency en-
hancement or eliminating it altogether will have a chilling effect on private en-
forcement of civil rights. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644-45 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the dis-
senters' position in Delaware Valley II, see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissenting position in
1682 [Vol. 38: p. 1661
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tioner can show that contingency enhancement is necessary to attract
competent counsel in the relevant market, enhancement is necessary to
enforce the purpose behind fee-shifting statutes.
2. Case-Specific Risk vs. Market Incentives
Having decided that Congress did not mandate contingency en-
hancement, the Dague majority rejects it in all cases because of the many
problems it sees with this method of calculation.143 Many of these
problems, however, are the result of the majority's characterization of
contingency enhancement as related to the risk inherent in a particular
case. 144 Justice Scalia identified three problems with contingency en-
hancement that directly result from the way he frames the issue.
First, when discussing enhancement based on how the "market"
treats contingency cases as a class, the Dague majority claims that "the
contingent risk of a case ... depends principally upon its particular mer-
its."' 145 From that perspective, the relevant market's incentives for at-
torneys to take contingent-fee cases will only ensure that cases "having
above-class-average chance of success will be overcompensated."' 14 6
The majority does not consider the possibility that a market-based in-
centive may be directed at the choice between a case with an up-front fee
and one where a fee comes only if there is a successful conclusion. This
market-based concept is entirely different from compensating for case-
specific risk. 14 7 In the system Justice O'Connor proposed, for example,
the enhancements would become standardized over time within a mar-
ket, yielding only the incentive necessary to attract competent
counsel. 14 8
Dague, see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. For a discussion ofJustice
O'Connor's dissenting position in Dague, see supra notes 122-26 and accompany-
ing text.
143. For a discussion of the Dague majority's reasons for rejecting contin-
gency enhancement, see supra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
144. See Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641-42. Enhancement should, however, be
based on "the fact of, rather than the degree of, contingency in a particular
case." Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court's Denial of Reasonable Attorney's Fees to
Prevailing Civil Rights Plainti, 17 N.Y.U. REy. L. &Soc. CHANGE 535, 557 (1989-
90). In Delaware Valley II, Justice White referred exclusively to case-specific-riskmultipliers when he stated that he and his plurality were "unconvinced that Con-
gress intended the risk of losing a lawsuit to be an independent basis for increas-
ing the amount of any otherwise reasonable fee." Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at725. 145. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2642.
146. IcL
147. For a discussion of market-based versus case-specific risk, see supranotes 143-57 and accompanying text.
148. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Delaware Valley II foresaw a classwide
study, encompassing all contingency cases within a market. 483 U.S. at 731-34;
see also Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 381 (3d Cir. 1987) (JusticeO Connor "contemplated that the class of cases to be studied [not] be anything
less than all contingency cases in a given geographic market."). A court's deter-
1993] NOTE 1683
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Second, Justice Scalia states that awarding fees in the same way as
private contingency agreements violates the "prevailing party" limita-
tion because it essentially compensates attorneys for losing other
cases.149 This again reflects the Court's one-by-one, case-specific view
of statutory-fee cases. It both ignores the purpose of contingency en-
hancement, to equalize statutory fee and up-front fee cases, and, as Jus-
tice Blackmun suggests, reveals "the [majority's] inattention to the
language of the statutes."150 The fee-shifting statutes award fees to pre-
vailingpartis, not their counsel. 151 Therefore, even the most exorbitant
fee award would not violate the prevailing party limitation so long as it is
given to a party that has actually prevailed.1 52
Finally, the Dague majority refuses to "engraft" contingency en-
hancement onto the lodestar model. 153 According to the majority, such
mination of the level of incentive necessary to attract competent counsel to a
contingent-fee case would be controlling for all cases where courts compute
fees. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 733 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Therefore,
the contingency enhancements awarded under such a system would be only
large enough to allow statutory fee cases to be competitive with up-front fee
cases in the eyes of private counsel. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
It is possible, however, to regard even that level of enhancement as unrea-
sonably providing a windfall for attorneys because attorneys will receive more
than the basic lodestar amount. See Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 (noting "strong
presumption" that lodestar represents "reasonable" fee). Enhanced-fee awards
that compensate for contingency in the same way as the private market could,
however, still comport with both the intent of Congress that fees be "reason-
able" and the Court's dictate in Hensley v. Eckerhart that awarded fees be "fully
compensatory." See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
149. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983)). The Dague majority believes that private contingent-fee arrange-
ments allow for greater fees than hourly arrangements because attorneys must
cover the costs of lost cases taken on the same contingent basis. Id. (stating that
"cases that turn out to be successful pay for the time [a lawyer] gambled on
those that did not"). This "risk pooling" is, according to the Dague majority, not
unlike awarding fees to an attorney for cases or claims not prevailed upon, and
therefore violates the prevailing party limitation of § 1988. Id. Similarly, in
Hensley, the Court held that because only "prevailing parties" could be awarded
fees under § 1988, fees could not be awarded for unsuccessful claims by winning
parties. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-35.
150. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2646 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2647 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (noting that "[r]espondents sim-
ply do not advocate awarding fees to any party who has not prevailed").
152. Justice Blackmun notes that the Court's concern about violating the
prevailing party limitation is "misleading [because its] real objection ... is that
the amount of an enhanced award would be excessive." Id. (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 2643. Justice Scalia believes that there are two competing "mod-
els" for fee awards, the "contingent-fee" model and the "lodestar" model. Id.
He considers these models to be incompatible and, in endorsing the "lodestar"
model, the Court has "generally turned away from the contingent-fee model."
Id. (quoting Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87 (1990)). As one author has
noted "compensation for 'contingency' is separate and distinct from 'contingent
fee arrangements.'" See Lachman, Note, supra note 140, at 474 n.35 ("The two
concepts are related only in that they both involve the risk of not being paid.").
1684
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a "hybrid" would be undesirable because it would allow considerations
of contingency to enhance a fee award but would not permit the absence
of contingency to reduce a fee award.15 4 There is, however, nothing
incongruous about adjusting the basic lodestar figure to account for
some otherwise-unreflected factor.155 Moreover, it is illogical to reject
contingency enhancement simply because it is only capable of adjusting
the lodestar in one direction. The riskiness of a statutory-fee case may
cause a private attorney to shun it. However, lack of risk will not cause a
lawyer to prefer a statutory-fee case to an hourly-fee case. Even if the
former will generate certain fees, it will do so only after much delay and
much work on fee petitions. Such a reduction for "lack of risk" would
also be inconsistent with both the fee-shifting statutes and the Court's
prior fee-shifting jurisprudence.1 56 A fee award smaller than the basic
lodestar would not pay for "all time reasonably expended," and could
not, by definition, be "fully compensatory." 1 57
IV. THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL AcTION
Courts evaluating fee petitions after Dague have uniformly found
that the opinion precludes any contingency enhancement.15 8 These re-
154. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643 (stating that "[c]ontingency enhancement is
a feature inherent in the contingent-fee model.., since attorneys factor in the
particular risks of a case in negotiating their fee").
155. Congress' citation to Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express in § 1988's leg-
islative history is recognition that many factors were not subsumed in the lode-
star calculation. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913. The Court recognized that the lodestar is an incomplete
measure of a "fully compensatory fee" in Hensley when it endorsed a fee calcula-
tion scheme that begins with the lodestar, which is augmented or decreased to
account for factors such as delay in payment that are not reflected therein. See
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citingJohnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488
F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)).
156. Section 1988 requires that "counsel for prevailing parties be paid,
as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time
reasonably expended on a matter.'" S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5913 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Court
has "established a 'strong presumption' that the lodestar represents the 'reason-
able' fee." Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. Moreover, reducing the lodestar to ac-
count for lack of risk would not calculate statutory fees "on the basis of rates and
practices prevailing in the relevant market." Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (quoting Missouri v.Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286 (1989) (not-
ing that ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit contingency fee
arrangements)).
157. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5913.
158. See, e.g., Alliance for the Mentally Ill v. White, 1992 WL 212431 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 27, 1992) (finding contingency enhancement foreclosed by Dague);
Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (finding contingency enhance-
ment foreclosed by Dague but allowing enhancement based on otherJohnson fac-
tors such as "undesirability of the case"); Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Gackenbach, 800 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding contingency enhance-
ment foreclosed by Dague).
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cent decisions reflect Dague's chief virtue, clarity. However, the impor-
tant congressional policy behind fee-shifting, to encourage private
enforcement of statutory rights, is hollow unless competent lawyers are
willing to represent wronged parties.159 Congress and the courts
should take all measures necessary to ensure that aggrieved citizens can
find competent counsel. Recent decisions have made it clear that the
Supreme Court is unwilling to interpret the existing fee-shifting legisla-
tion to require or even permit incentives that appear necessary to attract
lawyers to the cause of civil rights plaintiffs. 160 Therefore, Congress
should make plain what was implicit in section 1988's legislative history:
courts should compute statutory fees to make statutory-fee cases as at-
tractive as other private litigation.' 61
To avoid future confusion, legislation to overrule Dague will also
have to explicitly set forth a method for computing fees. The method
should be explicit enough to prevent courts from frustrating Congress'
purpose in enacting it. 16 2 Because of the Court's concern about ad-
ministrability, it would likely be unwilling to apply another vague legisla-
159. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5912-13 (noting that "fee awards are an integral part of the remedies neces-
sary to obtain ... compliance" with civil rights laws).
160. See Stemlight, supra note 144. Stemlight, writing before Dague, cites
evidence showing that "numerous attorneys have been forced to withdraw from
civil rights practice for financial reasons." Id at 538. One reason for this aban-
donment is that decisions such as Hensley v. Eckerhart and Delaware Valley II have
effectively defeated Congress' dictate that "reasonable" fees be awarded. Id. at
536. The courts' refusal to award fees that are "reasonable" given the incentives
currently required has been "subtle but devastating." Id. at 538.
161. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5913; Lachman, Note, supra note 140, at 483 ("The legislative history of
[§ 1988] ... clearly shows Congress contemplated contingency enhancements in
computing a reasonable fee award."); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 139, at 500("A system of contingency bonuses is helpful for statutes... that contemplate
enforcement by private attorneys general.").
Even without congressional action, some room remains for courts to fash-
ion interim remedies. For example, one concern lawyers have regarding taking
statutory-fee cases is the time that elapses between performing services and be-
ing paid for them. See Lachman, Note, supra note 140, at 486. One author even
suggests that enhancements for delay might provide enough incentive so as not
to require outright contingency enhancement. Id. (arguing that "courts can
achieve the incentive effect intended by Congress by awarding enhancements for
contingency tied to enhancements for delay"). The Court has held that "an ap-
propriate adjustment for delay in payment whether by the application of current
rather than historic hourly rates or otherwise is within the contemplation of
[§ 1988]." Missouri v.Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989). The Court's decision
in Dague does not appear to affect this delay enhancement.
Further, at least one court has concluded that Dague does not foreclose ad-
justment of the lodestar to account for the "undesirability" of a particular case.
See Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1992). For a discussion of Gomez,
see infra notes 185-187 and accompanying text. For a discussion of factors other
than contingency that warrant an enhancement to the lodestar, see infra notes
170-192 and accompanying text.
162. Commentators have suggested many methods for computing contin-
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tive contingency enhancement standard. 163 Further, Congress should
take this opportunity to consider the role litigation incentives will play in
private civil rights enforcement. The availability of contingency bonuses
in statutory-fee cases directly affects the number of civil rights suits citi-
zens bring. 164 It is possible, therefore, that Congress will consider cer-
tain rights and classes of cases important enough to warrant awarding
fees greater than those that would be fully compensatory.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO CONTINGENCY: TOWARD A FULLY
COMPENSATORY FEE
Justice Scalia and the other members of the Dague majority may con-
sider the lodestar to be the "guiding light" of fee shifting.165 However,
it is clear from the legislative history of section 1988 and the Court's
prior fee shifting cases that a fully compensatory fee is the foundation
upon which fee shifting has been built.166 The central difficulty in Dague
is the Court's narrow focus on the lodestar, which has caused it to elimi-
nate flexibility in the fee-determination process that may be essential to
granting a fully compensatory fee. 167 If even one prevailing party can
show that his or her counsel cannot be fully compensated without pay-
ment for contingency, the fee shifting system is not functioning as Con-
gress intended. 16 8
The goal of this section is to identify factors that courts should care-
fully scrutinize to ensure that a fee award is fully compensatory. The list
of factors that follows is far from exhaustive and the factors are not in-
tended as rationalizations for larger than necessary or erratic fee awards.
However, if a litigant can show that any of the following factors are pres-
ent in a particular case, failure to enhance a fee award to account for
them would result in a fee that is less than fully compensatory. Courts
gency enhancements. For an overview, see generally Leubsdorf, supra note 139,
at 505-12.
163. For a discussion of the Court's administrability concerns, see supra
notes 129-142 and accompanying text.
164. Leubsdorf, supra note 139, at 474 ("The contingency bonus affects the
level of private litigation and can be of crucial importance in deciding how many
rights are privately enforced.").
165. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 ("The 'lodestar' figure has, as its name sug-
gests, become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence.").
166. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910 (stating that "citizens must have the opportunity to re-
cover what it costs them to vindicate [their) rights in court"); Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) (attorney's fee statute "requires a 'reasonable fee,' and
there may be times when the basic standard of reasonable rates multiplied by
reasonably expended hours results in a fee that is either unreasonably low or
unreasonably high").
167. For a discussion of the Court's focus on the lodestar, see supra notes
90-95 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of Congress' intent in enacting fee-shifting statutes,
see supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
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may, therefore, increase a fee award to reflect the presence of these fac-
tors where evidence of them is clear and convincing without violating
the dictates of Dague.169
A useful point for the list of alternatives to contingency enhance-
ment are the twelve factors the Fifth Circuit identified in the 1974 case
of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express.170 These factors are: (1) the time
and labor required by an attorney in a statutory-fee case; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions presented in the case; (3) the skill requi-
site to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney because of the statutory-fee case; (5) the
attorney's normal and customary fee; (6) whether the fee in question is
fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations on the case imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount of money involved in the
case and the results the lawyer obtained; (9) the experience, reputation
and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the statutory-fee
case; (11) the nature and length of the lawyer's professional relationship
with the client; and (12) statutory-fee awards in similar cases. 171
While endorsing the lodestar method in Hensley v. Eckerhart,172 the
Supreme Court refused to prohibit reference to the Johnson factors as a
means of adjusting the lodestar upward or downward. 17 3 The Court
did, however, note that some of the Johnson factors "are subsumed
within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reason-
able hourly rate."' 174 In other words, the time and labor required by an
attorney is completely reflected in the reasonable number of hours cal-
culation.1 7 5 The factors regarding novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions, the skill requisite to perform the services properly and the
169. For a discussion of the Court's endorsement of factors outside the
lodestar other than contingency, see supra notes 159-164 and accompanying
text.
170. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
171. Id. The Court noted that "[t]hese guidelines are consistent with those
recommended by the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, Ethical Consideration 2-18, Disciplinary Rule 2-106." Id.
172. 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
173. Id. at 434. The Hensey Court noted that -It]he product of reasonable
hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other
considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or
downward."
174. Id. at 434 n.9 (citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)). In Copeland, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit expressly adopted the lodestar approach the Third Circuit de-
veloped in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890-91 (D.C. Cir. 1980). However, the
D.C. Circuit recognized that adjustments based on factors external to the lode-
star may still be used when necessary. Id. at 889. In particular, the court identi-
fied the "contingent nature of success" and the "quality of representation" as
factors that could warrant adjustment to the lodestar. Id. at 892-93.
175. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9.
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experience, reputation and ability of counsel are also reflected in the
lodestar's reasonable hourly rate calculation.1 76 The Hensly Court fo-
cused on the eighth factor, the results obtained, holding that a court
could reduce a lodestar to account for less-than-complete success on the
merits.' 77 The sixth factor, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, is
foreclosed by Dague. 178 This result, however, appears to be a product of
the Court's view that contingency-fee arrangements and the contingent
nature of a statutory-fee case are interchangeable concepts. 179
Three of the remaining six Johnson factors bear closer examination.
The factor regarding preclusion of other employment reflects more than
the time that is unavailable for other cases. It also includes the cases
that an attorney must turn away because of conflicts of interest that inev-
itably result from any case.180 For example, a case brought against local
police for alleged brutality may prohibit an attorney from representing
the defendant municipality in other matters. A litigant seeking to use
this factor to justify an increased fee award should, however, be required
to meet the most exacting standards of proof to show both the foregone
opportunities and the resultant harm.' 8 '
Another of the Johnson factors, the time limitations imposed by the
client or circumstances, may reflect more than just the time pressure
under which the lawyer is forced to work. Rather, this factor may con-
ceal work for other clients that was pushed aside or distributed to other
lawyers because of the urgency of the action at hand.18 2 It is not diffi-
cult to conceive of an indigent plaintiff who finds willing, counsel mere
176. Courts are not always consistent about which half of the lodestar cal-
culation subsumes which Johnson factors. For example, in Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886 (1984), the Supreme Court considered the factors regarding novelty
and complexity of the issues to be reflected in the number of hours billed rather
than in the rate charged by an attorney skilled enough to handle such difficult
issues. Id. at 898.
177. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. Under Hensley, the district court has great
latitude to adjust a lodestar downward when the prevailing party's success is not
complete. Id. An upward adjustment to account for the results obtained is also
available, but only "in some cases of exceptional success." Id. at 435.
178. For a discussion of the Dague majority opinion, see supra notes 86-116
and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of the Court's overlapping use of contingency fee ar-
rangements and the contingent nature of a case, see supra note 153 and accom-
panying text.
180. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.
1974). The court recognized "the fact that once the employment is undertaken
the attorney is not free to use the time spent on the client's behalf for other
purposes." Id.
181. Such foregone opportunities may not be quantifiable. The process of
fee enhancement is no more an exact science than is the lodestar calculation
itself. Courts should remain flexible enough to fashion methods of compensat-
ing for lost opportunities when the evidence is sufficient to show that no fee will
be fully compensatory without such restitution.
182. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
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weeks or even days before the expiration of a crucial statute of limita-
tions. In that instance, counsel may well have expenses and foregone
opportunities that cannot be reflected in an hours-times-hourly-rate
calculation.
The third relevant Johnson factor is the "undesirability" of the
case.' 83 This element recognizes that "[clivil rights attorneys face hard-
ships in their communities because of their desire to help the civil rights
litigant."' 8 4 The history of civil rights has been written by individuals
seeking to enforce their rights against the will of the majority. For ex-
ample, in Gomez v. Gates,' 85 decided after Dague, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California held that a suit by a
convicted robber against the police who shot him was "undesirable"
enough to warrant some adjustment to the basic lodestar.' 8 6 The court
recognized that "it is difficult for unattractive plaintiffs to prevail in un-
desirable cases for reasons unrelated to the relative merits of the
claim."' 8 7 Courts should look carefully at whether a lawyer's decision
to represent a particular client in a particular case has diminished the
lawyer's standing in the community, causing other potential litigants to
seek other counsel. 188 As with the preclusion of employment factor, this
is a complex and delicate fact question that requires persuasive
evidence.' 8 9
A final factor, not a product ofJohnson, is the time that elapses be-
tween the time services are provided to a statutory-fee litigant and the
time a lawyer is paid for them. This "delay in payment" factor compen-
sates lawyers for the financing they provide to their clients over the
course of statutory-fee litigation. The Supreme Court has explicitly en-
dorsed additions to the lodestar to compensate for the delay in pay-
ment.190 The Court has held that "an appropriate adjustment for delay
183. Id. at 717.
184. Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). TheJohnson court,
writing in 1974, spoke of the very real danger that lawyers representing civil
rights plaintiffs would be discriminated against by their "community or [their]
contemporaries." Id. The court found this discrimination "can have an eco-
nomic impact on [the lawyer's] practice." Id.
185. 804 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
186. Id. at 76. The court did not decide exactly how to adjust the lodestar
to account for this "undesirability." It proposed that either increasing the
hourly rate awarded to reflect the increased fees charged by lawyers who take
unpopular cases or an outright multiplier added to the lodestar would be appro-
priate. Id. at 76-77.
187. Id. at 76.
188. Se Johnson, 400 F.2d at 717; Gomez, 804 F. Supp. at 76.
189. However, if a plaintiff can clearly establish that representation of a
particular litigant has caused others to seek alternate counsel, courts should at-
tempt to fashion appropriate remedies. The Gomez court took the right approach
by evaluating alternative methods of compensating for "undesirability." Id. For
a discussion of Gomez and the approach taken by the district court, see supra
notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
190. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989) (holding award of fee
1690 [Vol. 38: p. 1661
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in payment-whether by the application of current rather than historic
hourly rates or otherwise-is within the contemplation of [section
19881."191 When considering this factor, courts should require litigants
to make some showing as to the harm caused by delay in payment. As
one court suggested, "[a]t a minimum, [a] court needs to have evidence
of the rate of market interest and the time value of money over the pe-
riod of the litigation."19 2
Other factors may also exist in an individual case that require com-
pensation to achieve a fully compensatory fee. Lawyers do not expect
statutory-fee cases to provide windfall fees. However, they do expect to
be fully compensated for the services they provide and the hardships
they endure. Lawyers may well be more willing to take statutory-fee
cases and to endure the hardships often associated with them if courts
are careful to recognize and compensate for extraordinary circum-
stances when they exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current statutory fee system focuses almost exclusively on the
lodestar to addresses the concern regarding the appropriate method for
ensuring that potential civil rights litigants can get the representation
they need. It is clear that the reasonable-hours-times-reasonable-rate
calculation is fully compensatory in many cases. In Dague, the Court
chose to focus exclusively on the lodestar because it was unable to con-
ceive of a workable alternative. 193 The wholesale exclusion of certain
considerations-those identified in Section V, for example-from a stat-
utory fee may well be inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting fee-
shifting statutes. 194
Given the availability of methods other than contingency enhance-
ment, such as those identified in Section V, Congress should take action
soon to clarify its intent and to standardize the methods of fee shifting to
ensure the predictability that will attract competent counsel. The fee-
that included enhancement for delay in payment not barred by l1th
Amendment).
191. Id. at 283-84. The Court's conclusion that an increase in the basic fee
to account for delay in payment was rooted in the notion that "market" rates are
presumed to be reasonable when calculating the lodestar. Id. Given the lost
value of the money over the time that elapses between performance of the serv-
ices and payment, the Court felt that some adjustment was necessary to arrive at
"market rates" for the services performed. Id.
192. Fletcher v. O'Donnell, 729 F. Supp. 422, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
193. For a discussion of the Dague Court's reasons for embracing the lode-
star and rejecting other alternatives, see supra notes 90-116 and accompanying
text.
194. Congress' basic intent was that awarded statutory fees be "fully com-
pensatory." See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (reasonable fee must be one that fully
compensates). For a discussion of congressional intent in enacting fee-shifting
statutes, see supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
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shifting system is, after all, a legislative creation and Congress must ac-
cept the responsibility of providing guidance to the courts when they
seek it.19 5 Until Congress provides comprehensive guidance, however,
courts should use the means still at their disposal, such as compensation
for "undesirability" or adjustment for delay, to provide a rational fee-
shifting structure "[i]f our civil rights laws are not to become mere
hollow pronouncements."' 96
Kyle R. Kravitz
195. See Lachman, Note, supra note 140, at 491 ("Congress has the ultimate
responsibility to ensure that its statutory intent is carried out.").
196. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5913.
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